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ABSTRACT
We develcp a theory of optinal capital structure based on the idea that
debt ath equity differ in their priority status relative to future corporate
cash pants. A catpany with high (dispersed) debt will fird it hard to
raise new capital since new serity-holders will have lew priority relative
to existii senior creditors. Conversely for a conpany with lew debt. We
shew that there is an optimal debt-equity ratio arxl mix of senior an junior
debt for a corporation whose managemant may unlertake unprofitable as well as
profitable investments. other thins, cr theory can explain the
ctervation that profitable fin have lew debt. In addition, it predicts
that (bog-term) debt will be high if new investment is risky ard on average
profitable, or if assets in place are risky an new invesbnt is on average
unprofitable.
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Since the time of Modigliani and Miller's famous irrelevance theorem,
economists have devoted much effort to relaxing the theorem's assumptions in
order to understand the real-world trade-offs between debt, equity and other
corporate financial instruments. In particular, literatures have developed
that explain financial structure as an attempt to reduce taxes (see, e.g.,
Modigliani and Miller (1963) and Miller (1977)); as a signaling device (see,
e.g., Leland-Pyle (1977) and Ross (1977)); as a bonding device (see, e.g.,
Grossman-Hart (1982) and Jensen (1986)); as a way of completing markets (see,
e.g., Stiglitz (1974) and Allen-Gale (1988)); or as a device for dividing up
control rights between various claimant groups (see, e.g., Aghion-Bolton
(1988), Hart-Moore (1989), Bolton-Scharfstein (1990), Diamond (1989),
Harris-Raviv (1989) and Zender (1989)).
While each of these approaches has provided useful insights, none has
been entirely successful in explaining the choice of financial structure. On
the one hand, the tax, signaling and bonding theories all rely on an
exogenous cost of bankruptcy to explain why firms are not 100%
debt-financed.1 Not only is this theoretically unsatisfactory, but also,
given that estimated bankruptcy costs are not that high (see Warner (1977)),
it is unclear whether these theories can explain observed debt-equity ratios.
On the other hand, while market completion theories are consistent with high
debt-equity ratios, they do not explain the widespread use of debt and
equity, as opposed to more complex contingent securities, or why financial
intermediaries issuing derivative securities on corporations cannot complete
the market instead of the corporations themselves.2 Finally, recent control
theories do go some way toward explaining the costs of bankruptcy or default
and hence the disadvantages of high debt, but most deal with entrepreneurial
firms and do not analyze the choice between public debt and public equity.3
In this paper, we take a different, and we believe new, approach to
understanding corporate financial structure. We argue that an important
aspect of any claim issued by a corporation is its seniority or priority
status with regard to future corporate cash payments. For example, debt has
priority over equity in the sense that if the corporation owes creditors $100
and has P dollars to pay out, then creditors must be paid off first, so that
-1-equity-holders receive something only if P >100.In the same way, senior
debt has priority over junior (or subordinated) debt in the sense thatjunior
creditors receive something only after senior creditors have beenfully paid
off.
We argue that the priority structure of a firm's existing claims will
be important if the firm needs to return to the market in the futureto raise
funds for further investment. Suppose at one extreme that the firm is
initially 100% equity financed. Then raising funds for further investment
will be relatively easy since the firm can issue debt to the new
claim-holders, thus putting them first in line for any future payment. Since
claim-holders are prepared to pay for this attractive priority position, the
likelihood that the firm can carry out the new investment project ishigh.
At the other extreme, if the firm has a large amount of
(dispersed) initial senior long-term debt, any new claimants will be junior
to existing claim-holders (the senior creditors) and so the expected return
on new claims wil1 be relatively low. Hence raising new funds will be hard
and it is less likely that the firm will be able tocarry out the new
investment project.
In a world where management cannot be trusted always to make theright
investment decisions, either because it is incompetent or because it has
objectives of its own, there is an optimal balance between making further
investment too easy or too hard. (In the formal model of thepaper, we
assume that management is self-interested, rather than incompetent.) Weuse
this idea to analyze the corporation's optimal initial financialstructure,
and in particular the choice between (long-term) debt andequity. Our
analysis throws light not only on the debt-equity ratio of a corporation, but
also on the mix between different seniorities of debt. Our framework also
provides a clear-cut distinction between debt and equity: equity is a "soft"
claim in the sense that new claims can be created senior to it; while
(senior) debt is a "hard" claim in the sense that new claims can only be
created junior to it.
We can illustrate the main idea of the paper using a simpleexample.
Suppose that a firm has assets in place which yield a return of $200 at date
-2-2 if the state of the world is good and $100 if the state is bad. Assume
that the state becomes known at date 1, at which time a new investment
project becomes available. This project costs $20 and boosts date 2 earnings
by $30 in the good state and by $10 in the bad state (for simplicity, take
the interest rate to be zero).
Obviously security-holders want the manager to undertake the project in
the good state (when it increases net present value, NPV) but not in the bad
state. This can be achieved by having initial long-term debt which promises
$100 at date 2. Then in the bad state the manager cannot finance the project
since he (or she) needs to raise $20, but can offer new security-holders only
$10 (the total return of $110 minus $100 owed initial creditors). On the
other hand, the manger has no difficulty financing the project in the good
state, since he can offer new security-holders up to $(200 +30-100)at
date 2 in return for their $20.
Three points should be noted about this example. First, without initial
long-term debt, the manager will be able to invest in the bad state as well
as the good state since he can offer new date 1 security-holders up
to $(100+lO) at date 2. Second, long-term debt constrains management in the
bad state even though (a) it is riskless (the creditors receive $100 in both
states of the world); (b) equity has positive value before the state of the
world is realized (in the good state equity holders receive $110). In other
words, the observation that many firms have riskless (or close to riskiess)
debt and positive equity value is quite consistent with our theory. Finally,
in the example, there is no cost to raising the debt level above $100 (as
long as it is below $210). However, if we suppose that in the bad state
there are sometimes positive NPV projects of arbitrarily small profitability,
then a debt level greater than $100 will prevent some of these positive NPV
projects from being undertaken, and hence is undesirable.4'5
There are some similarities between our analysis and that of Myers
(1977). Like us, Myers develops a theory of financial structure based on the
distinction between assets in place and further investment. In Myers' model,
a large level of debt is costly because it causes firms, which are supposed
to act on behalf of initial shareholders, to pass up profitable projects,
since much of the benefit from these projects accrues to creditors rather
-3-than shareholders. Firms trade off these costs against thetax benefits of
debt.
Myers' analysis begs the question of why management acts on behalf of
initial shareholders. If management is prepared to acton behalf of an
outside group at all, i.e. it is not self-interested,why could it not be
encouraged to act on behalf of shareholders and creditors as a whole, thus
apparently removing the costs of debt finance (after all, individual
investors who diversify may hold a combination of debt andequity anyway)?6
In contrast, we assume that management is self-interested andso cannot be
made to act on behalf of any group except itself. Inour model, the cost of
debt is not that management passes up profitableprojects because they are
not in the interest of shareholders, but rather thatmanagement cannot
finance profitable projects that are in the collectiveinterest of
shareholders and creditors.7
Our model also has parallels to Jensen's free cash flowhypothesis
(see, e.g., Jensen (1986)). Jensen has argued thatmanagers will use
retained earnings to finance negativepresent value investment projects
unless forced to pay these earnings out to investors.Jensen sees debt as a
way to make management disgorge funds since, if management fails tomeet
interest payments and defaults, creditors can force thefirm into bankruptcy.
Jensen's theory does not, however, explain thecosts of debt, i.e. why
corporations are not 100% debt-financed.
Our model differs from Jensen's in that weanalyze the role of
financial structure in controlling the flow of fundsinto the firm rather
than the flow of funds out of the firm, Thatis, in our model high debt is
good (or bad) because it makes it difficult for the firm to raisefurther
funds in the future; we ignore the threat ofbankruptcy or liquidation in
forcing the firm to pay out funds.
We proceed in this way for three reasons. First, tomodel bankruptcy
and liquidation requires dealing with a complexset of issues distinct from
those analyzed here; we hope to explore these ina subsequent paper.8
Second, there are a number of situations in which the threat ofbankruptcy or
liquidation —evenif effective —isunlikely to change our results. Our
-4-analysis applies in particular to a firm which needs cash in the short-run to
finance long-term projects. For such a firm there is no obvious role for
short-term debt as a means of getting cash out of the corporation; however,
there j a role for long-term debt to control the flow of funds into the
corporation.
Finally, in practice, the threat of bankruptcy may be less powerful in
forcing corporations to disgorge funds than is sometimes thought. In the
United States, management can usually put a corporation into Chapter 11 and
continue to manage the corporation's assets, keeping creditors at bay, for
long periods of time (particularly if the liquidation value of the assets is
low relative to the going concern value). Furthermore, to the extent that
dispersed creditors become the new (dispersed) shareholders in the
corporation, it is unclear why they should have a greater ability to control
the disbursement of funds during or post-bankruptcy than dispersed
shareholders and creditors did pre-bankruptcy. Thus a model which ignores
the disciplinary role of bankruptcy may be of practical as well as
theoretical interest.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is laid out in Section 2.
Section 3 characterizes optimal financial structure and derives a number of
comparative statics results concerning the relationship between a firm's
optimal debt/equity ratio and the mean and variance of the return on assets
in place and on new investments. Among other things, we show that our theory
is consistent with "the two most striking facts about corporate finance" (see
Myers (1990)): profitability and financial leverage are negatively correlated,
and increases in leverage raise market value. Conclusions follow in
Section 4.
-5-2. The Model
We consider a three-date model in which a corporation's security
structure is chosen at date 0, an investment decision is made by management
at date 1, and funds are paid out to investors at date 2 (see Figure 1).
Date 0 Date 1 Date 2
I I
Security structure Investment Funds paid
chosen decision to investors
Figure 1
To simplify we assume that the investment decision is zero-one: either
the manager invests a given amount i in an investment project, or he invests
nothing. If he invests, the project realizes a return at date 2 equal to r.
In addition, the firm is supposed to have assets already in place, which
yield a return equal to y1 at date 1 andy2 at date 2. Any part of y1 which
is not used for physical investment is supposed to be saved in the firm at
the going rate of interest (rather than being paid out to security-holders at
date 1). For simplicity, we take this interest rate to be zero over the
whole horizon from date 0 to date 2.10
As emphasized in the Introduction, we are interested in a situation
where management may carry out some investment projects forpower or
empire-building reasons even though they are unprofitable (as in Marris
(1964) or Jensen (1986); see Donaldson (1984) for empirical support for this
hypothesis). To simplify, we consider the extreme case where the
empire-building motive is so strong that no ordinary financial incentive or
disincentive (e.g. stock options) can deter themanager from investing at
date 1. Hence the only way to stop him from investing is toprevent the
necessary funds from being made available at this date. In contrast, we
suppose that at date 2 there are no investment opportunities and so the
manager is willing to pay out all accumulated funds (one interpretation is
that the firm is liquidated at date 2; note that we assume that themanager
cannot abscond with the date 2 funds).
-6-As also emphasized in the Introduction, we abstract from any role that
the date 0 security structure might have in forcing the manager to disgorge
funds at date 1. Formally, we suppose that even if the manager has promised
creditors a sum of money at date 1, he can always default, and carry on
running the firm (and investing) in bankruptcy with the same date 2 financial
structure.11 Note that our analysis applies in particular to a firm which
always needs cash in the short-run (i.e. y1 <iat date 1); the reader
uncomfortable with our treatment of bankruptcy may wish to focus on this
case, where there would be no obvious advantage to having debt due at date 1,
even if this did force the manager to pay out funds.
To recap, the firm's situation is characterized by four variables (y1,
i, r). As of date 0, these variables are uncertain. For simplicity, we
assume that this uncertainty is completely resolved at date 1 and y1, y2, r,
i, become common knowledge at this date, i.e. there is no asymmetry of
information between management and the market. (Of course, the date 1 return
y1 must be determined at date 1; we suppose that y2, rand i become known as
well.) However, although y1, y2, i, r are observable at date 1, they are not
verifiable.12 Finally, we suppose that the probability distribution
F(y1,y2,i,r) is common knowledge at date 0; and that y1, y2, i, r have finite
supports.
Security Structure
Although y1, y2, i, r are not verifiable, we suppose that the total
amount paid out to security-holders at date 2, denoted by F, is verifiable.
Thus securities can be issued at date 0 with claims conditional on P.
Examples are a class of bonds with a promised total repayment of 100 (the
bonds pay 100 if P100, and P otherwise); and a class of common shares
which pays P minus any payments to creditors.
We suppose that any securities issued by the firm are held by a large
number of small investors who are risk-neutral with respect to the firm's
return (e.g. because it is idiosyncratic).13 Given that the securities are
widely dispersed, any attempt by the firm to renegotiate these securities at
-7-a later date is likely to be extremely difficult because of hold-out and
free-rider problems. In fact, we assume that such renegotiation is
impossible (we return to this issue in the Conclusions).
Given our assumptions about verifiability and impossibility of
renegotiation, the most general security structure consists of contingent
debt, along the following lines. The firm issues a single class of
securities at date 0 with an (enforceable) promise that if P dollars are
distributed at date 2, this class will collectively receive 0(P) of them,
where 0 ￿ 0(P) P. (The "0" in 0(P) denotes the old, or original, date 0
security holders.) In addition, management is given permission to issue any
new securities it likes at date 1. That is, management can earmark the
residual amount N(P) —(P-0(P))for new investors at date 1 in the attempt
to finance new investment. (The "N" in N(P) denotes the new investors at
date 1.) Note that a choice of 0(P) close to or far away from P at date 0
constrains the firm more or less in its investment choice at date 1.
Securities defined in precisely this way are not, to our knowledge,
observed. However, we show shortly that, under two mild assumptions,any
choice of 0(P) is equivalent to a package of "standard" securities,
consisting of equity and various seniorities of debt. Thus for the moment we
stick with the general specification 0(P).
Given N(.) (or equivalently 0(.)), consider the position ofmanagement
at date 1 once (y1, y2, i, r) are realized. If
y1 i, the manager will
obviously invest since he can finance this out of retained earnings: he does
not have to go to the market at all. The total pay-out to investors at date
2 will be P —
y1
-I+y2
+r,consisting of y2 from the old assets, r from
the new project andy1 -Ifrom the saving of date 1 retained earnings.
If y1 < i, the manager can invest only if he can raise (i -
y1)from the
market. If he does invest, P —r+y2(there are no retained earnings at
date 1), and so the most he can offer the market at date 2 is N(r+y2).
Given a zero interest rate, it follows that themanager will be able to
finance the investment if and only if N(r +
y2)￿ i -y1.(Recall that
r +y2is known at date 1.) Assuming this inequality holds, wesuppose that
the manager offers new security-holders at date 1exactly (i -y1)at date 2
-8-so that they break even. The amount left for initial security holders at






We may summarize the above discussion as follows:
(a)If y1i, investment occurs, P —r+y1
+y2
-iand the
return to initial security-holders is y1 +y2+r-i.
(b) If y1 <iand N(r +y2)
i -y1,investment occurs,
P —r+y2
and the return to initial security-holders is
y1 +"2+r-i.
(c)If y1 < i and N(r +y2)
< I -y1,
investment does
not occur, P —y1
+y2
and the return to initial
security-holders is y1 +y2.
We assume that the security structure is chosen at date 0 to maximize
the firm's total market value, i.e. the expected return to the initial
security holders. This assumption can be justified in two ways. First, the
firm may be owned prior to date 0 by a single large investor who wants to
"get out" and selects the initial security structure to maximize his wealth.
Second, one can imagine that the firm consists entirely of (dispersed) equity
prior to date 0, but that the firm is subject to a hostile takeover at this
date and management is forced to restructure the firm to maximize the market
value of equity in order to stay in control.14
Subtracting y1+y2 from the initial security-holders' return in cases




(a) and (b); we may define an optimal security structure as follows.
Definition. An optimal security structure at date 0 is represented by a
function N(P), which solves:





So far we have allowed the slope of N(P) to be almost arbitrary. With
a minor modification in the manager's set of available actions, however, we
can restrict N to have a slope between zero and one. Recall that y1, y2, r,
i have finite support and so P takes on finitely many values, say P1 <P2
<P .Assumethat the manager can commit himself at date 1 to lower the
n
return both of the investment project and of the assets in place, e.g. by
selling off some fraction of the assets at an artificially low price or by
hiring extra workers. Suppose P, < andN(P.) >N(P)for some j <k.Then
the firm's date 0 market value can only increase if N(Pk) is raised to equal
N(P). The reason is that the low value of N(Pk) cannot be effective in
deterring management from investing, since if y2 +r— andN(Pk) <-
￿N(P),
the manager will raise the (i -y1)dollars necessary to invest by
committing himself to lower total return from to P. Thus if N(Pk) is
raised to N(P.), the same investment decisions occur but total return is
generally higher since the manager is not encouraged to engage in wastage.
An extension of this argument shows that date 0 market value can only
increase if N(P) is replaced by max N(Pt) for each j. This yields a
monotonically increasing N.
A similar argument shows that the slope of N can be set less than or
equal to one, if the manager can always raise more funds than he needs for the
investment project and save the rest at the going rate of interest. Suppose
<kand N(Pk) -N(P)
>P1-
P. Then the firm's date 0 market value will
not change if N(P.) is raised to N(Pk) -k





+P, themanager can raise (i -Y1)+




This yields a total date 2 return of k' out of which
the manager can repay new security-holders up to N(Pk)i-
y1
+
Againthis argument can be extended to show that date 0 market value will be
unchanged if N(P ) is replaced by max (N(Pk) -k
+P4).This yields an N
kj
whose slope is less than or equal to one.
From now on, therefore, we assume that N has slope between 0 and 1. In






(2.3) or 0 AN(P)
when we solve for optimal security structure.
Representing 0 or N by a Standard Package of Securities
We now show that any function N satisfying (2.2)-(2.3) can be
implemented by an appropriate package of standard securities -- in
particular, equity and noncontingent debt of various seniorities.
Let us begin by defining standard noncontingent debt and equity.
Definition. A standard package of debt and equity consists of n classes of
debt and a single class of equity. The jth class of debt, j —1 n, is
characterized by an amount d collectively owed to class j at date 2 and a
maximum additional amount Ad. of indebtedness to class j that the firm can
take on at date 1 (i.e. a covenant in the initial debt contract allows the
firm to issue new debt at date 1 until the total amount owed class i is d +
Theclasses are ranked by seniority with 1 being the most senior (in
the sense that it must be paid off first) and n the most junior. Any new
class j debt issued at date 1 ranks pan passu with existing debt of that
class -- inparticular, it is junior to debt of classes k<j and senior to
debt of classes k>j. Equity is junior to all debt in two senses: (i) it is
entitled to a return only if all debt-holders have been fully paid; (ii) thefirm always has the freedom to create an (n+l)th class of debt ofany size at
date 1, which is junior to all existing debt but senior to equity. Finally,
without loss of generality, we suppose that no additional equity can be
issued at date 1.15
This description of debt and equity seems to accord with commonusage
(with the exception of our assumption that no new equity can be issued -- we
return to this shortly) and, moreover, securities with these characteristics
are observed in practice (see Brealey and Myers (1988)). Note that the above
description allows for the possibility of "dilution" of debt in two ways.
For a given total date 2 payment P, the firm can give class j debt-holders a
lower share of P either by issuing more debt of that class at date 1 (if d.
>0)or by issuing more debt of a senior class (if sdk >0for some k <j).
In both cases more security-holders, senior to or of equal rank with classj,
have a claim to P and so there will be less for class j debt-holders.16 Note
that equity is infinitely dilutable given our assumption that the firmcan
issue unlimited amounts of class (n+l) debt which is senior to it. It is for
this reason that we assume that no new equity issues are allowed: such issues
dilute existing equity, but in the present context they will haveno effect
since potential dilution is already infinite.
Let us now consider the relation between the above standard debt and
equity package and the function N discussed before. Suppose it is known at
date 1 that the firm's date 2 pay-out will be P. To calculate the maximum
part of P which can be earmarked for new security-holders, suppose the firm
dilutes existing debt and equity as much as possible, i.e. at date 1 it takes
on additional indebtedness of Ld. for each j and creates an (n+l)th class of
debt to receive all remaining profit at theexpense of equity (so td÷i —
Definejto be the most junior class that will receive a positive part of P.
where j satisfies
(d1 +d1) +. . .+ (d1 +d1))
<P ￿ (d1+M1) +...+ (d+
(That is, classes 1 3 -1are fully paid, class j is only partially
paid, and classes 3 +1 n +1receive nothing.) Then the portion of P
accruing to new claimants at date 1, represented by N(P), equals
-12-(2.4) N(P) —td1+... + +
P-
(d1
++ ... + d1+1d1)
d
+
sincenew and old class j debt-holders are treated on a pro-rata basis.
Initial date 0 claimants receive the residual P-N(P).
Figure 2 illustrates N(P). For 0P ￿ d1 + — P1,j —1(only the
most senior class of creditors receive any payment) and the slope of N(P) —
td1/(d1-s-Ed1)
(every extra dollar is divided in the proportions Ad1:d1 between







P2,j —2and the slope of N(P) —Ad2/(d2-fAd2)
(class 1 creditors are fully
paid and every extra dollar is divided in the proportions Ad2:d2 between new






Figure 2We have seen how a standard debt/equity package yield a particular
function N satisfying (2.2)-(2.3). It is also clear from Figure 2 that the
converse holds: given function N satisfying (2.2)-(2.3), we can find a













and so on where P takes on the values P <P<... < P.[Thesolution of
1 2 n
(2.5) is —
N(P1),d1 —P1-N(P1),M2 —N(P2)-N(P1),d2 —P2-N(P2)
-
that d., 0 by (2.2)-(2.3).)
This procedure relies strongly on the finiteness of the random variable
P. Note, however, that if P is continuous, it is possible to approximate N
as closely as desired by choosing a random variable with finite support which
approximates P.
Three simple examples of financial structure illustrate the foregoing
discussion and act as useful reference points in our analysis of optimal
financial structure in the next section.
(1) A pure equity firm (i.e. d. —M.—0for all j).
Here j —n-fl,id —and so n+l
N(P) —P.
In words, since equity can be infinitely diluted, all of P can inprinciple
be earmarked for new investors.
-14-(2) A firm with a single class of debt that cannot be diluted (n —1,d > 0,
0).
Here for P ￿ d1, j —1,while for P > d1, j —2.
N(P) —Max(P-d1, 0),
Thus (2.4) implies
as in Figure 3a.
That is, for Pd1, all of P must be given to senior debt-holders and there
is none for new investors. On the other hand, for P > d1, the firm can issue




Figure 3a Figure 3bstructure simple debt/equity.
(3) A firm with two classes of debt: a negligible amount of senior debt,
with an option to borrow a finite amount of additional debt of the same
seniority at date 1 (d1 0, d1 >0);and a large amount of a second
class of debt with no option to borrow any more (d2 —, —0).
Here for P M1, —1,while for P >M1,
j —2.Thus, by (2.4),
N(P) —Kin(P,
as in Figure 3b.
In words, for P M1, all of P can be earmarked for new holders of
senior debt, but for P M1, all of the residual P-d1 must be given to
existing junior debt holders.
-16-3. Optimal Security Structures
An optimal security structure, which solves (2.1) subject to
(2.2)-(2.3), balances the following two competing objectives. On the one
hand, if N(P) is close to P, the manager will have a lot of scope for raising
funds at t—l, and hence may make unprofitable investments. On the other
hand, if N(P) is close to zero, the manager will have little scope for
raising funds and hence may miss profitable investments.
It is clear from (2.1) that a first-best security structure would ensure
that N(r+y2) i-y1 if r > i, and N(r+y2) < i-yr if r < i. Unfortunately,
this is generally infeasible. However, if it were known that all potential
investments were profitable, there would be no difficulty in obtaining the
first-best.
Proposition 1
If r always exceeds i, then the first-best can be obtained by issuing no
debt at date 0 (a pure equity firm: d — — 0for all j).
Since there is no danger of the manager making an unprofitable
investment, it is best to give him the flexibility to raise as much money as
he can at date 1, by having no debt (i.e. setting N(P) —P)Notice that
N(r+y2) —r+y2
rii-yr, so the investment will always go ahead, as
required in the first-best.
The opposite extreme, where no investment is ever profitable, is almost
as simple.
Proposition 2
If i always exceeds r, then at date 0 it is optimal to issue a large
amount of nondilutable debt (d1 —, Ad1—0).
-17-The effect of a large amount of nondilutable debt (i.e. setting N(P) —
0)is to ensure that the manager is never able to raise further funds at t—l.
However, this does not mean that he never invests. For ify1 exceeds j he
will have enough cash to make the unprofitable investment anyway; in this
event, investment cannot be deterred no matter what security structure is in
place (and so in general the first-best is unobtainable))7
Another simple case is where the total return from existing assets,
is fixed.
Proposition 3
If y1+y2 is deterministic, then at date 0 it is optimal to issuean
amount y1+y2 of a single class of nondilutab].e debt (a simple debt/equity
structure: d1 —y1+y2,M1 —0and d — —0for all j >1).
Proof If y1 ￿ 1, then the investment will take place irrespective ofN(.).
So the only event to consider is where themanager requires i-y1 >0to make
the investment. The proposition claims that N(P) —max(O,P-y1-y2} is
optimal. Notice that with this NC.), if the investment is togo ahead the
manager can raise at most max (O,r+y2-y1-y2) —max(O,r-y1). The investment
will then take place 1ff max
{O,r-y1) i-yr; i.e. 1ff r1. Hence this
must be an optimal NC.): the manager's private incentives coincide with the
social incentives when i >y1.
Q.E.D.
The intuition behind Proposition 3 revealssomething about how the
general model works. The difficulty faced by the originalsecurity holders
at date 0 is that they cannot disentangle the uncertain returns fromexisting
assets (y1+y2) from the uncertain returns from new investment (r-i).
Proposition 3 tells us that this difficulty disappears if the totalreturn
-18-y1+y2 from existing assets is fixed. One can mortgage this return by issuing
undilutable senior debt d1 —y1+y2
at date 0; and because the manager can
only issue securities junior to d1, he cannot invest at date I without first
convincing the market that it is profitable. (The exception are those states
of nature in which y1i, where the manager has sufficient cash at date 1 to
pay for the investment -- profitableor otherwise -- withoutreturning to the
18
market.)
The optimal security structure in Proposition 3 corresponds to what we
called simple debt/equity in Section 2: a single class of debt, d1 —y1+y2,
which cannot be diluted.19 In Propositions 4, 6 and 7 below we will see that
there are many other distributions F(y1,y2,i,r) for which a simple
debt/equity structure is optimal.
It is not always the case that an optimal security structure takes such
a simple form.
Example 1
Suppose y1 —0and r —g(y2),where g(.) is a continuous, strictly
increasing, deterministic function. Then one can obtain first-best by
putting N(P) —N,the (unique) solution to
N +g1(N)—P.
(It is straightforward to confirm that (2.2) and (2.3) hold.) For a given
-l r (and hence y2 —g(r)), the manager can raise up to N(r+y2) to finance the
investment. But by construction, N(r+y2) —r.Moreover, since y1 —0,the
manager needs to raise the full cost i to make the investment -- whichmeans
he will be in a position to invest iff r ￿i(i.e. the first-best is
implemented).
A special case of this example is where g(.) is linear, say r —0y2,
where 0 >0.In this case a linear sharing rule between old and new investors
is optimal: N(P) —GP/(l+0).One could implement this simply by issuing a
-19-large single class of debt d1 at date 0, with a covenant to the effect that a
further amount Ad1 —0d1of the same class can be subsequently issued at
date 1.
To make progress in characterising an optimal security structure for the
general case, it is helpful to make use of our earlier assumption that
(y1,y2,i,r) take only a finite number of values. In particular, we shall
assume that they take only integer values.20
As can be seen from program (2.1), the only thing that matters about a
security structure is whether or not N(r+y2) i-y1 for each vector of
realisations (y1,y2,i,r). Given that y1,y2,i,r take only integer values,
itfollowsthat w.l.o.g. we can restrict N(.) to be an integer too.
In effect, we choose
n —N(P)-N(P-l)
to be either 0 or 1 (the two constraints on N(.) imply thatn, cannot take
values other than 0 or 1), where, since N(0) —0,
P
N(P) — n,o.O
Takesome P for which n —1.Consider the ramifications of lowering n,
from 1 to 0 -- ineffect lowering N(P) by 1 for all PP. This will stop
the manager from making certain investments which he hitherto was able to




where N(.) is the old security structure (i.e. prior to the reduction in
ne).
To see this, setr+y2 —P.We learn from N(P) —i-y1that in this state the
-20-manager was only just able to make the investment i.But since PP we
know that the effect of changing n, from 1 to 0 is to lower N(P) by 1; and so
after the change the investment i is infeasible.
Of course some of the lost investments may have been profitable, others
unprofitable. The net loss to the date 0 investors must be nonnegative at
an optimum:
5(r-i)dF(y1,y2,i,r)
0 if n, —1. (FOCi)
N(r+y2)—i-y1
r+y2P
A similar line of reasoning applies if n, —0.Specifically, at an
optimum the date 0 investors cannot benefit from changing n from 0 to 1
(thereby enabling the manager to raise additional funds in certain states of
nature):
5(r-i)dF(y1,y2,i,r)
0 if n —o.22 (FOC2)
l+N(r+y2)—i-y1
r+y2P
The two "first-order' conditions (FOCi) and (FOC2) can be usefully
combined. Consider a P for which n —1and n÷1 —0.The net loss to the






or equivalently: E[r-ir+y2—P & i-y1—N(P)) ￿0, (FOC3)
-21-where we adopt the convention
E[r-ilr+y2—P & i-y1—N(P)] —0 if Prob(r+y2—P & i-y1—N(P)) —0.
We can learn quite a lot about the nature of an optimal security
structure from the behaviour of the conditional expectations:
K(P,N) E[r-i(r+y2—P & i-y1—N].
In particular, the following condition and lemma will be important:
Condition K For any P,N such that P N:
K(P,N) >0 —> K(P,N)0 for any P-PN-N ￿ 0.
LemmaIfCondition K holds, then a simple debt/equity security structure
is optimal.
Proof See Appendix.
The intuition behind the Lemma is straightforward. K(P,N(P)) is the
expected value of a marginal date I investment given a total date 2 payout
of P. Condition K implies that there is a cutoff value of P,say *,such
that the expected value of a marginal date I investment is negative [resp.
positive] if P < P* (resp. P > P*]23 Other things equal, then, one would like
to lower N(P) for P < *,andraise N(P) for p > p* ut we have to contend
-22-with the constraints (2.2) and (2.3). It should be clear from Figure 3a that
a simple debt/equity security structure does a good job of balancing these
goals.
Propositions 4, 6 and 7 give different sets of sufficient conditions on
the joint distribution F(y1,y2,i,r) for Condition K to be satisfied.
Proposition 4
If (4a) i is deterministic,
y1 is independent of y2 and r,
(4b) E(rlr+y2—P) is increasing in P.
then at date 0 a simple debt/equity security structure is optima]..24
Proof (4a) implies that K(P,N) is independent of N. And together with (4b),
it implies that K(P,N) is increasing in P. Hence Condition K is satisfied.
Now apply the Lemma.
Q.E.D.
The intuition behindProposition 4 is that, when i is fixed, new
investmentshould not occurfor low values of r+y2 -- sincethis signifies
lowr, on average; whereas the investmentshould go ahead for high values of
r+y2.A simple debt/equity security structure implements this quit well:
for low values of r4-y2 the manager is unable to raisefunds at t—l and is
thereforeless likely to be in a position to invest; conversely for high
values of r-1-y2.25
Before we move on to the other results relating to simple debt/equity,
itis worth looking at the oppositecase to Proposition 4.
-23-Proposition 5
If (5a) r is deterministic,
is independent of y1 and i
(Sb) E(ili-y1—N) is increasing in N,
then it is optimal at date 0 to issue two classes of debt: a negligible
amount of senior debt, with an option to borrow a finite amount of additional
debt of the same seniority at date 1 (d10, d1 > 0); and a large amount of
a second class of debt with no option to borrow any more (d2 —, Ld2—0).
Recall that we considered this form of security structure in the final
example in Section 2; see Figure 3b and surrounding discussion. In a sense
it is the obverse of simple debt/equity: the manager can raise the first Ld1
of any P, but no more (N(P) —mm(P,d1)).
The intuition behind Propositions 5 is that, given a fixed r, low/high
values of i represent good/bad investment opportunities and should be
encouraged/discouraged. To this end, the manager is enabled to borrow up to
a fixed amount of money Ed1 but no more.26
The next two propositions concern the case where all four variables
are independently distributed, and Condition K applies.27 The
propositions are likely to generalize to the case of positive correlation
between y2 and r, however, since this is helpful to Condition K. This is
useful to know, since in practice one might expect there to be some common
shock to the returns from existing assets and the return from new investment
(c.f. the numerical example in the Introduction).
-24-Proposition 6
Suppose y1,y2,i and r are independent and uniformly distributed on
the discrete consecutive integer supports (y y), 2''2
i)and (r r) respectively. Then if
(6a) r-r ￿ y2-y2
(6b) and I-i
a simple debt/equity security structure is optimal at date 0.
Proof See Appendix.
We can also make progress in the case where the four variables
are approximately normally distributed. The advantage of the
normal distribution is that it yields a simple expressions for K(P,N).
Specifically, if for the moment we ignore nonnegativity and finiteness, and
assume that (y1,y2,i,r) are independently normally distributed with means
and variances (c,a,o,c2)respectively,then from standard
distribution theory it follows that
2 2
K(P,N) —Mr+ t)[p- r
- -- 212)[N -m.+
2 2
Notice that Condition K is satisfied if and we can
then appeal to the Lemma to show that a simple debt/equity security structure
is optimal. This is the method of proving:
-25-Proposition 7
Consider a set of four distributions F1(y1), F2(y2), F(i) and F(r)
which are each constructed by truncating normal distributions N(p,a )tothe
left of zero (and scaling so as to integrate to I over the remainingsupport,
R÷) --where and a — respectively. Now take a
sequence of similar distributions
(F1m(Y1), F2m(y2), F.m(i), Fm(r) m —0,1,2,3,...
which are constructed in the same manner, except that a constant m is added
to the ji's (prior to the truncation).
2 2
Suppose:r0 >
Thenthere exists an M such that for m ￿ M, ify,y2, i and r are
independent and have distributions F1 (y1), F2 (y2), F. (i), Fr Cr), a simple
debt/equity security structure is optimal at date 0.
Propositions 4, 6 and 7 can be interpreted as saying that if the
riskiness of the return from new investment (relative to that of the return
from existing assets at date 2) is higher than the riskiness of the size of
the new investment (relative to the return from existing assets at date 1),
then a simple debt/equity security structure is optimal at date 0.
-26-Comparative Statics
We turn now to some comparative statics analysis. Specifically, we ask:
assuming that a simple debt/equity security structure is optimal at date 0,
how does the size of the optimal debt level change with the joint
distribution F(y1,y2,i,r)? Let the optimal debt level be d. From program




If we treat F as continuous for the moment, we can express the
first-order condition for an interior optimum as
(3.2a) E[r-ir-i+y1-+-y2-.d & i￿y1] —0;
or, equivalently,
(3.2b) E[r-ir-i+y1+y2—d & r+y2d] —o.29
The following two, rather natural, conditions enable us to determine how
the optimum debt level changes with the means of y1, y2, i and r.
-27-Condition C
o￿ E[r-iIr-i+y1+y2—d & iy1]￿ 1 for all d;
o￿ E[r-ir-i+y1+y2—d& r+y2d]
1 for all d,d.
Although neither half of Condition C is automatically satisfied, each
is nonetheless quite intuitive: given two random variables X—r-i and
Y—y1+y2, the conditional expectation of X given X+Y—d will typically rise
but by less than a dollar -- forevery dollar increase in d. (And by
assumption this simple idea is not complicated by the presence of the
additional conditioning inequalities iy1 and r+y2d respectively -- which,
notice, are independent of d.)
Proposition 8
Suppose that a simple debt/equity security structure is optimal at date
0. Then if Condition C is satisfied, the optimal debt level d will rise as
(a) a positive constant is added to y1, y2 or i
(b) a positive constant is subtracted from r
(i.e. as the means of y1, y2 or i rise, or as the mean of r falls --leaving
variances unaffected). Moreover, a dollar shift in y2 will lead to a dollar
increase in d.
Proof See Appendix.
-28-The intuition behind Proposition 8 is straightforward. An increase in
the mean of i, or a decrease in the mean of r, implies that investments are
less likely to be profitable, and there is therefore a need to constrain the
manager with higher debt. As the mean of y1 rises, the managerhas more cash
with which to invest at date 1, and so at the margin his ability to borrow
should be further constrained: the debt level should rise. Finally, if a
dollar is added to every realisation of y2, then at date 2 a total payout of
$P+l has the same significance (in terms of revealing information about r) as
a payment of $P would have had prior to the change; hence the optimal N(.)
schedule shifts to the right by a dollar -- implyingthat the optimal debt
level rises by a dollar.
To make these points more concretely, and to understand certain other
effects, we now look at two examples. For simplicity we shall suppose that
y1 and i are certain, with i > y1 (otherwisethe manager could always invest
at date 1). From Footnote 24, we know that simple debt/equity is an optimal
security structure. Let d be the optimal debt level. We examine the
comparative statics properties of d not just with respect to the means
(Proposition 8), but also with respect to the variances of y2 and r: ciand
respectively. We then suggest reasons why these variance effects are
robust.
Example 2
Suppose y1 and i are deterministic, with i > y1; and y2, r are
independent and (approximately) normally distributed with means 2' r and
variances c, a2.(C.f. Proposition 7.) Then by standard distribution theory








- 29-and hence the optimal debt level d is
d —y1
+
It follows that d rises
Proposition 8. Also, notice
(i.e., r >i),then d rises
new investment is on average






as y1, 2' rise and/or r falls --confirming
that if new investment is on average profitable
as rises and/or falls; and vice versa if
unprofitable <i).These variance results
Suppose y1 and i are deterministic, with i >y1;and y2, r are
independent and uniformly distributed on [u2-s2,u2+s2],r5r1r+5r]
respectively.(C.f. Proposition 6.)
In order to reduce the number of cases under consideration, we assume
that Sr <s2;there are then only two cases to consider: (a) r > (new
investment is on average profitable); and (b) <i(new investment is on
average unprofitable) •31
Case (a) >i(new investment is on average profitable)
To avoid making the case uninteresting, assume that -
Sr
<i
(otherwise the optimal d would be zero, by Proposition 1).
The optimal debt level d is indicated in Figure 4 -- wherethe support
of y1+y2 is the horizontal of the rectangle, and the support of r-i is the
vertical. Notice that conditional on (r-i)+(y1-+-y2)—d -- i.e.conditional on
lying along the 1350 line intersecting the rectangular support --the
expectation of r-i is zero, as required by (3.2a).32
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Itfollows that d rises as y1, i2,irise and/or z falls --confirming
Proposition 8. Also, d rises as s rises and/or s2 falls -- confirmingthe
variance results of Example 2.
-31-
Figure 4: Example 3, Case (a): >Case (b) < i (new investment is on average unprofitable)
To avoid making the case uninteresting, assunie that + Sr >
(otherwisethe optimal d would be infinity, by Proposition 2).
This is very similar to case (a), except that now the relevant diagram
is as in Figure 5.
Figure 5: Example 3, Case (b): <




i.e.d — r -S+i.
It follows that d rises as y1, L2 i rise and/or 'r falls --confirming
Proposition 8. Also, d rises as falls and/or s2 rises --confirmingthe
variance results from Example
To summarize what we have learned so far from Examples 2 and 3:
The effect on the optimal debt
level of an increase in
p2
i U S
Case (a): Mr > -
Case(b): r < - -
Webelieve that the variance results of Examples 2 and 3 are fairly
robust. To see this, consider the case where p >1.and is just small
enough that all new investments are profitable. Then it is optimal to set
the debt level at or below y1 + where is the minimum possible value of
this ensures that all investments take place. Now raise so that r is
occasionally just below i. At the margin, the debt should be raised to above
+ 2' to prevent the manager from making bad investments in at least the
lowest y2 states. That is, d rises as a2 rises, as in Table 1.In fact, the
new optimal debt level will be just above y1 + (if it were much higher,
then profitable investments would be missed in the low y2 states). It
follows that an increase in -- becauseit lowers 2 -- lowersthe optimal







Table 12. . 2 There is another way of understanding this. As 02 rises relative to a,
there is less information about r-i from the fact that r-i+y1-fy2—d. In the
limit, the LHSof(3.2) becomes simply u-i, and there won't be an interior
optimum. If >j itis best to give the manager maximum freedom to
finance new investment; i.e. set d—O. Put simply, if the manger's ability to
raise fresh capital at date 1 is almost entirely determined by the realized
returns from existing assets, then there is little point in using a security
structure to screen out the bad new investments. One may as well rely on
prior (date 0) information -- i.e.whether or not new investments are on
average profitable.
It will be clear from the last argument why, if new investments are on
average unprofitable, the comparative statics properties of the variances
and a are reversed.
r
The values of debt and equity
For the purposes of empirical testing, it is useful to know also how the
value of debt -- andof equity, and of the debt/equity ratio -- changewith
the underlying parameters. Example 3 provides a useful vehicle to study this
question, since these values can be calculated explicitly. (Explicit
formulae are not available for the normal case, Example 2.) In the Appendix
we establish the following comparative statics properties:
-34-the effect of an increasein
"l2 14r2
S
onthe value of debt, v(d) + + + - +
onthe value of equity, v(e) 0 0 - + + -
onthe debt/equity ratio, + + + - - +
v(d)/v (e)
Table 2: Example 3, Case (a): r >
the effect of an increase in
Y1 M2 r 2
S
onthe value of debt, v(d) + + + - + -
onthe value of equity, v(e) 0 0 - + - +
onthe debt/equity ratio, + + + - + -
v(d)/v (e)
Table 3: Example 3, Case (b): j<i
Notice from Tables 1-3 that the comparative statics properties of the
value of debt mirror those of the level of debt. Also, the value of equity
-35 -has the opposite comparative statics properties. Thus the debt/equity ratio
has the same comparative statics properties as debt.
We should add a caveat. Even for this relatively simple example, the
values of debt and equity reflect quite a subtle combination of effects. For
this reason, the results in Tables 2 and 3 are probably less robust than
those in Table 1.
-36-4. Conclusions and Extensions
Our theory has a number of empirical implications which seem worth
investigating. First in those cases where simple debt and equity are
optimal, we have derived a number of testable comparative statics properties.
We have shown that (ceteris paribus): the higher is the average profitability
of a firm's new investment project, the lower will be the level of debt; the
higher is the average profitability of a firm's existing assets (assets in
place), the higher will be the level of debt. In addition: an increase in
the riskiness of new investment projects raises the optimal debt level if the
average return on new projects is positive, but lowers it if the average
return on new projects is negative; and an increase in the riskiness of
assets in place lowers the optimal debt level if the average project return
is positive but raises it if it is negative.
Some of these predictions are novel. For example, a theory which
trades off the tax benefits of debt against the bankruptcy costs of debt
would not distinguish between assets in place and new investments, and would
predict a positive correlation between profitability and the debt level. In
contrast, our theory explains the observed strong negative correlation
between profitability and leverage (see Kester (1986) and Myers (1990)), as
long as high profitability is associated with new projects. Another
difference between the tax theory and our theory is that whereas the tax
theory predicts that the debt level falls as a firm's return becomes riskier
(since the probability of bankruptcy rises), our theory predicts that the
(long-term) debt level rises if new projects become riskier and are on
average profitable or if assets in place become riskier and new projects are
on average unprofitable. Finally, our theory can explain why managers
increase leverage in response to a hostile takeover (to bond themselves not
to undertake future investment), and hence why most leverage-increasing
transactions raise market value (of course, other theories can also explain
this finding; see Myers (1990)).
Our theory also suggests anew way of thinking about the "flexibility"
ofa firm's financial position. Consider a firm which, for some reason,
-37-suddenly needs an injection of new capital just to keep going (an example
would be where an uninsured factory burns down). The most that the firm can
raise from the capital market to deal with this emergency can be regarded as
a measure of the firm's flexibility or financial slack. In the case of a
firm with simple debt-equity, this measure is given by the current value of
equity, since the firm can always in extrernis raise this sum by issuing a
large enough amount of junior debt (or new equity). Our framework suggests
that for the case of a firm which does not have simple debt-equity, a more
appropriate measure of slack is EN(P) (where the expectation is taken with
respect to P); this typically exceeds the value of equity since it includes
the amount by which existing debt can be diluted (see (2.4)). Our analysis
yields the rough prediction that optimal financial structure will be chosen
so that EN(P) will be greater --togive the manager more flexibility to
invest -- themore desirable is new investment.
An important assumption that we have made is that a firm cannot
renegotiate with its claim-holders at date 1 when a new investment project
becomes available. Note that, if renegotiation were costless, there would be
no disadvantage in having high debt since if the new project had positive net
present value the creditors would always be prepared to renegotiate their
claims so as to allow the project to go ahead. Thus in a world of costless
renegotiation, it would be optimal to have infinite (or very high) debt, in
effect forcing the firm to return to the capital market -- or,to put it
another way, to seek permission from its creditors -- forevery new
investment.
Such an extreme outcome is unrealistic, and there are strong
theoretical reasons why. Because investors are wealth-constrained and risk
averse, a major corporation will typically be financed by a sizable number of
relatively small investors, rather than a small number of very large ones.
But this means that free-rider and hold-out problems are likely to make
renegotiation extremely difficult, if not impossible. In particular, if the
debt level is too high to allow a positive NPV project to take place, then
while it is in the collective interest of creditors to forgive a portion of
the debt, it is in any single creditor's interest to refuse to forgive his
-38-share since the chance that his decision will affect the outcome is very
small. Thus in many cases one would expect the renegotiation process to
break down and investment not to occur; moreover there is plenty of
evidence -- casualand otherwise -- thatthis frequently happens in
34
practLce.
One possible way round the free-rider problem is to include a provision
in the initial debt contract that the aggregate debt level can be reduced as
long as a majority of creditors approve (i.e. the majority's wishes are
binding on the minority). It turns out that such a provision is illegal in
the U.S.35 However, even if it were legal, there are strong theoretical
reasons for thinking that it would not solve the problem. For majority rule
to work well, individual investors must keep abreast of the firm's progress
and have very good information about a firm's investment prospects. This is
a very demanding requirement in a complex world where most of investors' time
is quite properly allocated to other activities. To put it another way, our
assumption that the profitability of new investment is public information
should not be taken literally -- itis meant to apply to the most
sophisticated arbitrageur, rather than to the average investor. Thus to make
the firm's investment decision depend on a majority vote of average investors
would be rather like running the firm by a not very well informed committee
-- aprocedure whose record of success historically has been less than
outstanding.
For these reasons, our assumption that renegotiation is impossible
seems more than plausible for widely-held corporations.
There are a number of possible extensions of the analysis. First, the
assumption that the interest rate is deterministic could be relaxed and the
number of periods could be increased to allow for the possibility that
investment and financial structure today depend on the market's expectation
of these choices tomorrow. A multiperiod analysis might also explain the
existence of corporate securities other than debt or equity, such as options
or convertibles.36 In addition, a multiperiod analysis raises interesting new
questions about the meaning of seniority. To mention one: in what sense does
-39-a bond issued at date I with a promise to pay one dollar at date 4 have
priority over a bond issued at date 2 which promises to pay one dollar at
date 3?
Second, the assumption that all uncertainty is resolved at date 1 could
be dropped. One special feature of the present model is that high debt
prevents the firm from financing a positive NPV project only when the firm's
date 1 value of equity is zero (r4-y2-d <i-y1
and r >i—>y1+y2<d).This
is no longer true if some uncertainty remains at date 1.For example,
suppose y1 —0,i —20;and with probability 1/2, y2 —100,r —0,and with
probability 1/2, y2 —0,r —50.Then if there is $70 of (senior,
undilutable) debt, the firm cannot finance its positive NPV project, and yet
the date 1 value of equity is positive.37
Third, it is very desirable to make the treatment of bankruptcy more
realistic. In this paper we have supposed that bankruptcy is a
completely neutral event: the firm's position in bankruptcy is exactly the
same as its position outside bankruptcy (management retains control over the
assets and must operate within the firm's existing capital structure in both
uses).38 In future work it is important to develop a theory ofbankruptcy
which gives some power to creditors to liquidate assets and helps explain the
flow of funds out of the firm as well as into the firm.
Finally, our analysis has completely ignored the role of shareholder
voting and takeovers in a firm's choice of financial structure. Yet voting
and takeovers are important restraining forces on management. In future work
it is desirable to develop a theory that explains not only the priority
structure associated with different types of claims but also these claims'
control rights in particular, why debt, as well as being senior to equity,
carries the right to liquidate the firm or force it into bankruptcy; while
equity, which is junior to debt, has voting rights.
-40-FOOTNOTES
1Alternatively, the tax theory supposes that the tax authorities would
classify debt as equity --andcancel debt's tax-favored status --ifthe
debt-equity ratio became too high.
2See Merton (1990).
3Exceptions are Harris-Raviv (1989) and Zender (1989). For a very good recent
survey of market completion and control theories, see Allen (1990).
4This argument implicitly assumes that the firm cannot renegotiate with
senior creditors to reduce the debt from above $100 in the presence of
positive NPV projects. In the conclusions, we argue that such renegotiation
will be extremely difficult if the initial creditors form a dispersed group.
5Our theory of the costs of high debt has common features with the recent
literature on third-world debt. Sachs (1986), for example, has argued that
one of the costs of high debt is "debt-overhang": a country with large debt
may have difficulty attracting new investment funds since much of the benefit
from new investment will go to old creditors. The same point has been made
in the corporate context by Roe (1987), who argues that debt-overhang might
have thwarted Chrysler's K-car project in the absence of government
financing. These authors do not use this idea to develop a theory of capital
structure, however.
Note that the theory presented here is consistent with another oft-quoted
cost of financial distress: suppliers are unwilling to deal with a firm which
is close to bankruptcy. The point is that suppliers, just like providers of
capital, will be deterred because they have low priority in the claimant
queue.
For evidence that the total costs of financial distress can be very
significant, see Cutler and Summers (1988).
60ther papers which explicitly or implicitly assume that firms act on behalf
of initial shareholders include Myers and Majluf (1984); and many of the
contributions which argue that high debt is costly because it causes
management to take excessively risky actions (see, e.g., Stiglitz (1972) or
Jensen & Meckling (1976)).
71t should also be noted that our theory explains both the costs and benefits
of debt. Thus, unlike Myers, we do not need taxes to understand why firms
choose an interior debt-equity ratio.
8For a model in which the threat by creditors to liquidate assets in the
event of default forces a firm to pay out funds, see Hart and Moore (1989).
-F-i-9Our neglect of bankruptcy and liquidation distinguishes our analysis from
the recent papers by Stulz (1990) and Xie (1990). Stulz and Xie consider
models in which high short-term debt is good in that it forces management to
pay Out funds, but bad because it automatically leads to inefficient
piecemeal liquidation in the event of default (with, in Stulz's case, a loss
of investment opportunities); Stulz and Xie do not consider the possibility
that high debt prevents the firm from raising new capital.
10The investment can be interpreted to include maintenance of plant and
equipment, advertising or other marketing expenses, expenditures on raw
materials, incorporation of new technology, and recruitment and training of
employees (as in Myers (1977)).
11Note that this position is consistent with the idea that there is a
reallocation of claims from equity-holders to creditors in bankruptcy. The
important point is that the firm's operations -- includingits overall
financial structure --donot change.
means that the corporate charter could not, for example, state that the
firm may borrow one million dollars at date 1, but only if y2 exceeds two
million dollars; this is unenforceable.
assumption could be relaxed.
14Note that we implicitly assume that market value cannot be increasedby
forcing management to pay out of their own pocket for the (nonpecuniary)
benefits they will later receive from the firm's investment project; one
justification for this is that management has no (or little) initial wealth.
LSThat is, authorized share capital equals issued sharecapital.
implicitly assumes that any funds raised by issuing more debt do not
affect P. In fact, of course, the new funds will be used to finance
investment, and so P will rise. Hence class i creditors may benefit from the
dilution.17This is a case where there is an obvious potential role for short-term debt
to force the manager to pay out funds at date 1 (see our earlier discussion
in the Introduction and Section 2).
180ne point to observe about Proposition 3: the debty1+y2 is riskless.
However, the fact that it is riskiess does not mean that it isn't playing an
important role in preventing the manager from making unprofitable
investments. We discussed a similar example in the Introduction.
19The optimal security structures in Propositions 1 and 2 were also
simple debt/equity, with d1 —0and d1 —respectively.
20There is virtually no loss of generality here:any finite discrete support
of rational numbers is a subset of some uniform (integer) grid, provided the
units of measurement are chosen appropriately. If one or more of the
realisations of y1, y2, i or r happens to be irrational, then an arbitrarily
close rational could be substituted in such a way as to preserve the
inequalities N(r+y2)i-y1.
21Simply replace N(.) by its integer part. The two constraints on
(2.2) and (2.3), will be unaffected.
22Notice thel+N(r4-y2), as opposed to simply N(r+y2), in the range of
integration. This reflects the fact that N(.) is the old security structure
--i.e.prior to the increase in n.
23 .. . . Conditions(2.2) and (2.3) ensure that the qualifier P-P N-N0 in
Condition K will be satisfied by K(P,N(P)).
-F-3-24 is useful to note the following variant of Proposition 4: Ify1 and i are
both deterministic, then (4b) can be dispensed with. The reason is that new
investment occurs iff N(P) i-y1, i.e. in view of (2.3), iff Psome P
It follows that the optimum can be sustained by a simple debt/equity
structure with d —c-(i
-
y1).
There are many other ways of achieving the
optimum, however; this explains the apparent inconsistency between
Proposition 4 and Example 1 when i is deterministic.
fact, condition (4a) of Proposition 4 can be relaxed. It is enough that
i is independent of (r+y2)
(4a') y1 —i+u,where u is independent of i
(r+y2) is a sufficient statistic for r in the presence of u.
The point is that, under these weaker assumptions, K(P,N) is still independent
of N.
26Again, condition (5a) of Proposition 5 can be relaxed. It is enough that
r is independent of (i-y1)
(5a') —v-r,where v is independent of r
(y1-i) is a sufficient statistic for i in the presence of v.
We do not give a formal proof of Proposition 5, since it is similar to the
proofs of the Lemma and Proposition 4 -- withCondition K replaced by: K(P,N)
independent of P and decreasing in N.
27Although as in (4a') and (5a) above, full independence can be relaxed to:
r+y2 is a sufficient statistic for r in the presence of i-y1; and i-y1 is a
sufficient statistic for i in the presence of r+y2.
28We are glossing over atechnicality here. As defined, the distributions
F1 ,F2
,FFr are continuous, whereas our analysis has been carried out
for the case of finite distributions. To be rigorous, therefore, Proposition
7 should be stated for finite distributions which are approximations to
F2m, F.m, Fm (in the weak convergence topology) and for which Condition K
holds. (Finite approximations with these properties can be chosen.) For such
finite approximations, a simple debt/equity structure will be optimal.
-F4 —291n treating F as continuous, we are glossing over various technicalities.
To be rigorous, all the results of this section should be stated for finite
distributions which approximate the continuous distributions (in the weak
convergence topology) and for which Condition K holds.
For these finite approximations, we know that simple debt/equity is optimal
(since K holds). In addition, the optimal debt level is given approximately
by the solution to (3.2). To see this, consider first the case where the
limiting distribution is bounded (as in the uniform case). Then for the
finite approximations d is characterized by the pair of inequalities (FOCi)
at P —d+cand (FOC2) at P —d,where in both inequalities N(r+y2) —
max(O,r+y2-d)
andis the size of the (integer) grid. As the finite
approximation converges to the continuous limit, standard arguments (see
Parthasarathy (1967)) show that any solution to (FOCi) and (FOC2) must
converge to the solution to (3.2) (which, generically, is unique in the
uniform case for an interior optimum). It follows that all the comparative
statics properties established for the continuous case also hold for the
finite approximations.
A slightly different argument is required for the normal case since the
limiting distribution is unbounded. For each in, choose finite distributions
for the random variables y1,y1,i,r which approximate the normal distributions
N(i1,o), N(L2,c), N(t.,o), NOArC) in the weak convergence topology,
whose supports are (-m,oo), and for which Condition K is satisfied when in is
large. Replace y1, y2, i, r by (y1+m), (y2+rn), (i+m), (r+m), respectively.
Then simple debt/equity is optimal for a firm characterized by the
independently distributed random variables (y1+m), (y2+m), (i+m), (r+m).
Moreover, if we denote the optimal debt level by d, it is straightforward to
show that (d -2m)converges to the solution to (3.2) (which is unique in the
normal case). It follows again that the comparative statics properties
established for the continuous normal case hold for the finite
approximations.
30Notice thatS2,S are v'3 times the standard deviations of y2 and r
respectively.
-F-5-31Much the same analysis would go through if we dropped the assumption that s
< But then there would be three possibilities to consider:
(i) Mr >j+niax(s-s2,O),
(ii)
-max(ss2,0) <M < j+max(s-s2,O),
(iii) Mr <j-max(s-s2, 0).
Case (a) above corresponds to (i); case (b) to (iii); and (ii) cannot hold if
s <s.Whens > s ,someof the comparative statics effects we derive in
r 2 r 2
the text -- inparticular those concerning variances -- donot hold for the
"middle" possibility (ii). This is not surprising, in that as we shall see
these effects change sign in moving from case (a) (new investment is on
average profitable) to case (b) (new investment is on average unprofitable).
For this reason, when s > scertain statements that follow in the text
r 2
must be qualified by: "... ifthe average return to new projects is
sufficiently positive" (i.e. (i) holds); or "...ifthe average return to new
projects is sufficiently negative" (i.e. (iii) holds).
32The uniformity assumption means that all points in the rectangle are equally
likely. And the assumption 5r < 2 means that the rectangle is wider than it
is taller, so that the 1350 line cannot intersect both vertical sides.
Moreover for the optimal d it cannot intersect both horizontal sides either,
for then the LHS of (3.2) (a) would equal Mr1 > 0.
33 . Oneadditional point to note from Example 3.Provided we can be sure that
simple debt/equity remains an optimal security structure, it isn't essential
that y1 and 1. are deterministic. All that matters for the purposes of the
example is that (y1-i-y2) and (r-i) are independent and uniformly distributed.
(Even a degree of positive correlation could be readily incorporated; as we
have already suggested, such correlation would be natural if there is some
exogenous uncertainty which commonly affects the returns to existing assets
and the profitability of new investment.) This suggests the following
extension to our discussion of the variances: if new investment is on average
profitable [resp. unprofitable], then the optimal debt level rises as the
variance of i rises [resp. falls) or the variance of y1 falls [resp.
rises]
-F-6-34For a further discussion of the free-rider problem, see Roe (1987), and fora
recent formal, analysis, see Mailath and Postlewaite (1988). For evidence
that breakdowns occur in practice, see Cilson, John and Lang (1990).
35See Roe (1987)
36 -Optionsand convertibles -- andalso preferred shares -- correspondto
particular N(P) functions (see Section 2), but they do not have an
independent role since any N(P) function can be sustained solely by different
combinations of debt. That is, our analysis is consistent with, but does not
explain, options, convertibles, or preferred shares.
37The presence of uncertainty at date 1 might also lead to a distortion in the
manager's choice of project; for example, the manager might find it easier to
finance an excessively risky project than a less risky, but more profitable,
one.
381n a sense, we have steered a middle course between two extreme positions on
bankruptcy: the pessimistic view, that bankruptcy leads to inefficient
piecemeal liquidation of assets; and the optimistic view, that bankruptcy
procedure provides a forum for parties to renegotiate their claims (including
these claims' seniority) so that efficient liquidation and investment
decisions are made. Neither extreme is compelling. The pessimistic view
seems too pessimistic given that bankruptcy procedure (particularly. Chapter
11) is explicitly designed to prevent inefficient liquidation. On the other
hand, the optimistic view appears to imply that it is efficient for firms to
spend much or all of their time in bankruptcy; a conclusion that is hard to
stomach.
-F-7-APPENDIX
In this Appendix, we prove the Lemma, Propositions 6 and 8, and obtain
formulae for debt and equity values in Example 3.
Proof of Lemma
Take any optimal security structure represented by N(.). Unless this
security structure happens to be simple debt/equity (in which case the lemma
holds), there must be at least one P such that n, —1and —0.Now
proceed with the following algorithm:
For each P such that n —1and n1 —0,ask:
Can we change n1 from 0 to 1 without upsetting optimality?
If so, make this change. If not, ask:
Can we switch to n —0and n1 —1without upsetting optimality?
If so, make this switch.
Continue to make such adjustments to N(.) until no more can be made.
Notice that the algorithm must stop somewhere, since the net effect of
changing any n+i from 0 to 1 is to reduce the total number of zeros in the
(finite) sequence of n's; and this cannot cycle. Equally, the net effect of
switching any (nn1) from (1,0) to (0,1) is to shuffle the zeros towards
the start of the (finite) sequence of n's; and this too cannot cycle.
The idea of the algorithm is this. Either it will stop at a point where
there are no P's left such that n —1and n —0in which case we will
P P+l
have arrived at an optimal simple debt/equity security structure and the
lemma holds, Or it will stop at a point where for some P, not only doesn —
1and n1 —0,but also (FOC3) strictly applies at P and (FOC2) strictly
applies at P+l; i.e.
-A-l-K(P,N(P)) >0 (FOC3*)
and 5(r-i)dF(y1,y2,i,r)< 0 (F0C2*)
l+N(r+y2)—i-y1
r+y2P+l
We now use Condition K to show that these two strict inequalities are
inconsistent.
Since —0,we know that l+N(P) -N(P)P-P for PP+l. Combining
this with (FOC3*), we can apply Condition K (putting N—N(P)) to deduce that
K(P,N) 0 for PP+l and Nl+N(P). But then the LHS of (FOC2*), which
can be written
K(P,N) x Prob(r4-y2—P &
P￿P+l
N—l+N(P)
is nonnegative, a contradiction.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6
Consider a pair (PN) such that Prob [r+y2'-P and i-y1—NJ >0.It is






--unlessthere exists a P such that
P-y2 < randP-y2 > r,
or
t•+2< ' <
whichis impossible since by assumption r-r ￿ y2-2.
Also note that E[ili-y1—N] <-- unlessthere exists an N such that
>iandy1+N <i,
or < N <
whichis impossible since by assumption i-i ￿
We therefore conclude that E[rlr+y2—PJ E[ii-y—N]. This
means that Condition K is satisfied. Now apply the Lemma.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 8
Denote the LHSof(3.2a) by C(d). The first half of Condition C tells
us that
(A.l) 0 G'(d) 1.
-A-3-Typically, then, there will be a unique solution to (3.2a). Moreover, if some
change in parameter of F(y1,y2,i,r) causes the function G(.) to rise, then d
will have to fall in order to restore optimality (i.e. to restore the
equality C(d) —0);and vice versa.
A rise in the mean of r
Consider shifting the distribution r one unit to the right (implying a
rise in the mean of r, but no change in the variance). For a given d, this
will change the LI-IS of (3.2a) to
E[r+lir+l-i+y1+y2—d & iy1]
—1+E[r-ir-i+y1+y2—d-l& iy1)
—1+G(d-l) G(d) by (Al)
--wherethis G(.) is the old C (prior to the shift in r). To restore
optimality, d must therefore fall.
A rise in the mean of y7
Consider shifting the distribution y2 one unit to the right (implying a
rise in the mean of y2, but no change in the variance). For a given d, this
will change the LHS of (3.2a) to
E[r-ir-i+y1+l+y2—d & iy1]
—C(d-l) G(d).
--wherethis G(.) is the old C (prior to the shift in y2). To restore
optimality, d must therefore rise(infact, rise by one Unit).
-A-4-To obtain similar results for shifts in the means of i and y1, observe




& r+y2d]. The second half of Condition
C tells us that
(A.2) 0 ￿ 3H(d,d) ￿ 1.
3d
We can now proceed with:
A rise in the mean of i
Consider shifting the distribution of i one unit to the right (implying a
rise in the mean of i, but no change in the variance). For a given d, this
will change the LHS of (3.2b) to
E[r-i-llr-i-l+y1+y2—d & r+y2d]
—-l+ E[r-ilr-i+y1+y2-.d+l & r+y2d)
—-l+ H(d+l,d)
by (A.2) H(d,d)—G(d).
--wherethese G(.) and H(.) are the old C and H (prior to the shift in i).
To restore optimality, d must therefore rise.
A-5 -A rise in the mean of y1
Consider shifting the distribution of y1 one unit to the right (implying
a rise in the mean of y1, but no change in the variance). For a given d,




--wherethese C(.) and H(.) are the old C and H (prior to the shift in y1).
To restore optimality, d must therefore rise.
Q.E.D.
Computation of debt and equity values in Example 3
Case (a): >i.Ex post (i.e. at dates 1 and 2), the value of debt d
equals
d if either (y+y) d or (r-i)+(y1+y2) d;
otherwise.
From Figure 4 it follows that the ex ante (date 0) value of debt is given by






d-y1 ￿ y2 ￿
all r
--whereF(y2,r) is the distribution function of (y2,r). It is
straightforward but tedious to show that, given d —Yl+P2S2Mr+Sr+
.3 5( -s
v(d) — + -- r+S++rr
24s s2r
The total value of (debt +equity)equals the expected return from
existing assets, y1+is2, plus the expected return from new investment. That









v(e) —2(.t-i) + S2 -Sr
- r 8ss2r
Now it is a straightforward matter to confirm the comparative statics
properties in Table 2 in the text, where we use our assumptions: S < S2, ,U
> i and -s < i.(That is: 0 < < S < s2.)






The comparative statics properties in Table 3 in the text can easily be
confirmed.
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